Research index14 writeups · newest first

Research & Experiments

Security research · Studies · Benchmarks

Security research, studies, and technical experiments. Novel and interesting findings I dig into on my own compute: vulnerability and red-team writeups, model supply-chain and MCP security studies, benchmarks, and build logs, written up for anyone who finds them useful.

14 writeups

  1. FindingOn-chain7 min read

    The Empty Boss Chairfirst-caller-wins in privileged setup code

    A recurring structural flaw where permissionless setup steps let any first caller claim permanent privileged control — what it is, its famous precedent, how we hunt it, and how to close it.

    Pattern class; live instances in coordinated disclosure

  2. Negative resultAgents & MCP6 min readEdited 2026-10-07

    The Effort Knob Is a Cost KnobTurning Reasoning Effort Low-to-Max Moved No Security Number on glm-5.3

    Turning reasoning effort from low to max on glm-5.3 moved reasoning tokens 86x and latency 2.7x, and moved no security number: injection resisted at every level, gate evasions 0/420.

    0 / 420 gate evasions; effort moved cost, not security

  3. FindingAppSec6 min read

    Which Zip Tools Are Actually Dangerous in WordPressA Fixture-Verified Extractor Matrix (And What 1,800 Plugins Told Us About Who Ships the Dangerous One)

    Six traversal-shaped entries through every PHP zip family a WordPress plugin can reach: ZipArchive and PharData held, PclZip wrote outside the root. Then 1,824 plugins checked for who ships it.

    PclZip escaped the root; 1,824 plugins checked

  4. MethodModel supply chain2 min readEdited 2026-10-07

    Twin Fixtures, One VerdictPinning Scanner Coverage to the Payload Class

    A QA note, not a discovery: the same malicious pickle through two ingestion paths fires ModelAudit rule S201 both times. What twin fixtures prove about adapter-independence, and what they don't.

    Detection follows the payload, not the adapter

  5. Negative resultAgents & MCP5 min readMCP audit series · part 3

    MCP Excessive Agency in the Wild9 Real Servers, 5 Detection Classes, Zero Exploitable Bugs

    Discovery-only audits of nine real MCP servers. No exploitable vulnerability, but two new excessive-agency classes, one env-dump pattern, and two precision fixes. The honest lesson: MCP metadata alone cannot prove a tool safe or dangerous.

    9 real servers, 5 detection classes, 0 exploitable bugs

  6. MethodAgents & MCP3 min readMCP audit series · part 2Edited 2026-10-07

    MCP Audit Research Series, Batch 2Community Servers, and Why Recall Isn't Enough

    Discovery-only audits of three community and reference MCP servers: one real env-dump pattern, one safe-implementation non-finding, and a false positive that reframes the tool. Precision is next.

    False positives are the next frontier, not recall

  7. MethodAgents & MCP3 min readMCP audit series · part 1Edited 2026-10-07

    MCP Audit Research Series, Batch 1Six Real Servers, Two New Classes

    Discovery-only, deterministic audits of six real MCP servers (fetch, git, filesystem, sqlite, time, shell): no exploitable bug, and two new real-world-derived excessive-agency classes.

    6 real servers, 2 new detection classes

  8. MethodModel supply chain5 min readEdited 2026-10-07

    Chat-Template SSTIThe Inference-Time Supply-Chain Risk in Modern Model Files, and Testing Scanner Coverage

    GGUF chat templates are inference-time code paths. This corrected research note explains why raw fixture counts are insufficient evidence for scanner precision or a security finding.

    GGUF path matched standalone; two gadget families missed

  9. Negative resultModel supply chain7 min readEdited 2026-10-07

    The ML Model-File Supply ChainWhat Runs When You Load a Model, and How Scanners Hold Up

    Loading a model can execute code. Which model-file formats run code and why, then a defensive test of whether repackaging a known-bad file evades a mature scanner. Zero false negatives across 11 vectors.

    11 evasion vectors, zero false negatives

  10. FindingAgents & MCP4 min read

    The Wrong Lock on an Agent's AuthorityA Keyword-Evasion Hole in Our Own Dispatch Gate

    We audited the single gate that decides whether one AI agent's task auto-runs with real authority. Eight approve-required asks, rephrased off-keyword, all classified safe. Found in our own harness, patched, corpus added.

    8/8 rephrased approval asks bypassed the gate; all closed

  11. FindingAppSec3 min read

    What a Crash Oracle Can't SeeFuzzing Real CPython Parsers for Exception-Contract Bugs

    Coverage-guided fuzzing of real zipfile and gzip parsers surfaced three exception-contract robustness classes, plus the more useful lesson: a clean crash-fuzz report is not a clean-parser report.

    3 exception-contract robustness classes

  12. FindingAgents & MCP3 min read

    The MCP Trust Boundary Includes the SchemaWhy Description-Only Audits Miss Excessive Agency

    A tool with an honest description and an unconstrained path schema slipped past a description-only MCP judge. A deterministic scorer caught it, and a schema-aware judge recovered the miss 10/11 to 11/11.

    Schema-aware judge recovered the miss, 10/11 to 11/11

  13. Negative resultAgents & MCP3 min readEdited 2026-10-07

    AgentDojo Prompt InjectionA Correction — Both GLM Generations Resisted

    Correction: our harness read AgentDojo's security flag backwards. No transcript from GLM-4.6 or the glm-5.3 retest shows the injection executing, so the original 'agent defeated' claim is withdrawn.

    Both GLM generations resisted; 10/10 in the glm-5.3 retest

  14. BenchmarkML systems5 min read

    Independent TurboQuant Benchmarks on Consumer GPUs

    First published benchmarks of Google's TurboQuant at 7B scale on RTX 4080. 45 data points, 4 models, real VRAM measurements.

    45 data points, 4 models, real VRAM measurements